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ABSTRACT 
Mongolia is endowed with abundant natural resources from which it has generated a high 
level of economic growth over the past decade. Nevertheless, the country has already 
experienced some symptoms of the natural resource curse. This thesis argues that the 
quality of a country’s governance and institutions plays a crucial role in the management 
of resources, and therefore, it examines the political-economic environment of 
Mongolia’s resource sector. This study examines Mongolia’s performance on three steps 
of the natural resource management value chain: sector organization and the process of 
contract awards, the collection of taxes and royalties, and revenue distribution and public 
investment management. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that, while many 
resource-rich, developing countries experience civil war and conflict due to 
mismanagement of resources, Mongolia is not currently on this path. It concludes, 
however, that if the country does not effectively manage its resource sector, Mongolia’s 
young democracy may deteriorate. 
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Mongolia is endowed with abundant natural resources from which it has 
generated a high level of economic growth over the past decade. Nevertheless, the 
country has already experienced some symptoms of the natural resource curse. This 
thesis argues that the quality of a country’s governance and institutions plays a crucial 
role in the management of resources, and, therefore, it examines the political-economic 
environment of Mongolia’s resource sector. This study examines Mongolia’s 
performance on three steps of the natural resource management value chain: sector 
organization and the process of contract awards; the collection of taxes and royalties; and 
revenue distribution and public investment management. Furthermore, this thesis 
demonstrates that, while many resource-rich, developing countries experience civil war 
and conflict due to mismanagement of resources, Mongolia is not currently on this path. 
It concludes, however, that if the country does not effectively manage its resource sector, 
Mongolia’s young democracy may deteriorate. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Literature on the economic growth from natural resources concludes that the 
endowment of resource wealth does not always have a positive influence on the political 
and economic development of a given country. Instead, many developing countries suffer 
from the “resource curse,” which is a phenomenon that occurs when a resource-rich 
country is unable to manage resources appropriately for sustainable development, and its 
people experience low standards of living.1 Although such countries experience some 
growth in their gross domestic product, other key development indicators, including 
especially the quality of governance, remain lower than they should be.2 This thesis will 
examine the experience of mineral-rich Mongolia, and seek to answer the question, “Has 
Mongolia begun to experience the resource curse, and to which elements of the resource 
1 Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey (Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2010), 3.  
2 Naazneen H. Barma, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le, and Lorena Vinuela, Rents to Riches?, 
The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 44.  
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curse is Mongolia most vulnerable?” In exploring the political economy of natural 
resource governance in Mongolia, this thesis will determine how and why resource-rich, 
developing countries experience economic and political struggles, as well as social 
suffering, while extracting and allocating rents from the resources. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Mongolia had been a Socialist country strongly influenced by the Soviet Union until 
the 1990s. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia has been pursuing an 
independent policy that promotes democracy and an open market system. In relation, the 
political economy of the country changed tremendously, allowing for the presence of 
foreign investors that have wide experience and advanced technology in the extractive 
industry. The government, in consequence, has been facing new challenges. Crucially, 
the natural resource sector has become the most important part of Mongolia’s economic 
development; in turn, the country has become very dependent on rents from that sector. 
There are more than 8000 deposits with more than 440 types of minerals, including gold, 
silver, copper and molybdenum, lead, steel iron, coal, fluorspar, salt, semi-precious 
stones and crystal.3 According to World Bank data, more than 75 percent of total export 
was natural resources, and almost 40 percent of revenues were generated from minerals 
in 2008. Because of such dependence on minerals, Mongolia was confronted with 
governance and macroeconomic risks.4 Literature on the resource curse affirms that 
whether a country becomes resource-dependent or not is conditioned by its government’s 
ability and institutional capacity to make decisions and overcome challenges in sector 
management.5 Therefore, it is important to analyze governance of the sector and 
institutional features of Mongolia in order to avoid this dependence. 
In addition, the government lacks experience in collaborating with foreign 
extractive firms. In 1978, Mongolia accumulated some experience in the natural resource 
3 M.A.D., “The Mongolian Real State Report,” http://mad-research.com/mongolia/macroeconomics-
mongolia/mining-sector-mongolia/.  
4 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2009), 
1. 
5 Barma, et al., Rents to Riches?, 9. 
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sector during the establishment of the joint mining venture, Erdenet, between the 
governments of Mongolia and the Soviet Union. However, today’s environment demands 
advanced experience and knowledge, since competition for resources has increased 
globally, and actors in the field have become more mature and competitive. Therefore, it 
is a challenge for the Mongolian government to deal with experienced investors. 
Scholars have observed that analyzing the sector governance and institutional 
quality through the steps of a “natural resource management value chain” (an analytical 
framework described in more detail in the next section), provides the opportunity to 
assess the political economy of extraction and allocation of rents.6 Thus, this thesis will 
contribute to the existing knowledge of sector practitioners and researchers by 
characterizing the weaker dynamics in resource management and developing domestic 
policies that match the Mongolian context.   
In a broader sense, the natural resource sector has a major impact not only on 
economic development but also on the national security of Mongolia. Countries are 
becoming more integrated economically and environmentally; in the meantime, non-
traditional threats are emerging because of competition over natural resources, which 
further intensifies conflicts and pressures on democracy. Therefore, the main components 
of the re-adopted National Security Concept of Mongolia are linked to the natural 
resource sector, and this thesis will contribute to the discourse on the democratic and 
non-violent environment within the country. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
The most common problems related to the resource curse are explained in 
association with corruption and “Dutch disease,” specifically, rent seeking and the 
detrimental effects of volatility that Mongolia may already be experiencing. Corruption 
and rent seeking are interconnected behaviors that are prevalent in resource-rich, 
developing countries. Governments and political elites may provide more opportunities 
and advantages to their preferred allies or networks in terms of access to natural resources 
or favorable policy decisions, such as tariff protection. Rent seeking occurs in association 
6 Ibid., 9. 
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with an environment that has high tax revenue, lack of transparency, and corruption that 
in turn, distort efficiency and the allocation of resources. Furthermore, it weakens the 
state and its accountability. According to Transparency International, Mongolia has been 
affected by corruption; though, it is demonstrating some improvements in anti-corruption 
efforts, with its shift in the ranking of corrupt countries from 120 in 20117 to 94 in 2012.8 
The other fact is that in 2008, the Mongolian economy was badly affected by the global 
financial slowdown, which was a consequence of the United States’ economic crises. The 
price of a ton of copper fell from $8,000 to $3,400, which turned Mongolia’s monetary 
balance negatively from 4.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) surplus into a 
deficit of 9.6.9 These data suggest that the country is extremely dependent on natural 
resources. “Dutch disease” is another common dimension of the resource curse. It is “a 
process whereby new discoveries of favorable price changes in one sector of the 
economy cause distress in other sectors,” according to Terry Karl.10 The Mongolian 
mining sector’s contribution to overall GDP has increased from 8 to 22 percent, while the 
agriculture sector that was once a main contributor to the economy has declined by the 
same percentage since 2001.11 “Between 2001 and 2008, manufacturing in Mongolia fell 
from 30 to 20 percent of gross industrial output (GIO) while mining grew from 50 to 70 
percent of GIO that is a classic sign of impending “Dutch disease.”12  
This thesis presents its arguments with the hypothesis that Mongolia has 
experienced some symptoms of the resource curse and has become resource-dependent 
due to the government’s lack of capability in managing the sector. The relatively low 
7Transparency International, “Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011,” 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results.    
8 Transparency International, “Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results,%20accessed.   
9 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox, 3.  
10 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 5. 
11World Bank, “Mongolia Economic Update 2013.” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/11/06/mongolia-economic-update-november-2013 
(accessed June 9, 2014), 19–20.  
12 Jeffrey Reeves, “Development Planning in Mongolia: Failure and Potential,” 
http://www.apcss.org/development-planning-in-mongolia-failure-and-potential/.  
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quality of institutions and governance in the mining sector is crucial, in turn, in making 
Mongolia more vulnerable to other resource curse dimensions, such as increased conflict 
and the potential for democratic backsliding. However, Mongolia can avoid or mitigate 
its experience of the various dimensions of the resource curse if the government improves 
its ability to manage the sector. To accomplish this, the government will need to examine 
and understand the steps of the natural resource management value chain, including: 1) 
sector organization and contract awards, 2) collection of taxes and royalties, and 3) 
revenue distribution and public investment management.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is an empirical case study that analyzes the Mongolian natural 
resource sector. It focuses on understanding the political economy of natural resource 
management through an application of the analytical framework of the value chain. It will 
take the governance and institutional quality of the Mongolian mining sector as an 
intervening variable, and the conflict and regime type will be the dependent variables of 
the study. The correlation between institutional quality and the resource curse is 
explained by analyses through the three previously mentioned steps of the natural 
resource management value chain. The thesis will also present a comparative analysis of 
practices in the Mongolian mining sector and assess them against good practice criteria 
for each step of the value chain. The thesis will draw from the experiences of other 
resource-rich countries that either avoided or suffered from the resource curse. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE  
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter includes the 
thesis overview, research question with a contextualized background, importance, 
problems and hypotheses, methodology, and layout of the thesis structure. Chapter II 
presents the literature review on the natural resource curse and its dynamics, including 
discussion of natural resources and the natural resource management value chain.  
 5 
Chapter III focuses on the intervening variable of the thesis, which is the 
governance and institutional quality of the Mongolian mining sector. The analysis of how 
institutional quality and the resource curse are associated will be presented through the 
analytical framework of the value chain. 
In Chapter IV, the discussion emphasizes that conflict and regime type, as 
dependent variables, are interrelated with institutional quality. The analyses in the 
chapters will be focused on the political economy dynamics around the natural resources 
and the importance of high-quality sector institutions. Chapter V concludes the thesis 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many literature reviews related to the natural resource curse. This thesis 
highlights some of the main findings of the literature by focusing on governance and 
institutional quality of the natural resource sector. Furthermore, it studies how the quality 
of governance and institutions impact potential conflict and regime types of a resource-
rich, developing country. 
A. GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
In the 1980s, scholars recognized the idea of a resource curse, identified various 
factors and developed different theories. For example, in 1995 Sachs and Warner 
reported that economic dependence on natural resources and the slow growth of economy 
are linked.13 Richard M. Auty affirmed that, based on the developmental level of natural 
resource-dependent countries since the 1960s, “not only may resource-rich countries fail 
to benefit from a favorable endowment; they may actually perform worse than less well-
endowed countries.”14  
During the beginning of the twenty-first century, Naazneen H. Barma and her co-
authors, in Rents to Riches?, argued that political economy dynamics could lead resource-
dependent developing countries along the resource curse pathway. Moreover, not all 
states achieve development by adopting the policies and experiences of countries that 
converted their resource rents into wealth. In other words, a good policy for one country 
is not always efficient for another country; hence, countries need to have development-
oriented policies that fit their specific context. Barma et al. explain further that weak 
governance and the institutional quality of the resource sector lay a foundation for the 
curse, and governments experience a more serious form of the curse if they ignore the 
warning signs.15  
13 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 11.  
14 Richard M. Auty, Sustaining Development in the Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 1.  
15 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 5‒9. 
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To avoid the curse and achieve sustainable development, “governments should be 
able to make credible inter-temporal commitments to both extractive companies and its 
citizens, and the political regime should be inclusive such that the government faces the 
incentives to use rents to provide public goods that enhance collective welfare.”16  
B. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT VALUE CHAIN STEPS 
This thesis relies upon the definitions of the natural resource management value 
chain, clearly described in Rents to Riches?, which can be used for inclusive assessment 
of political economy dynamics and sector governance of the countries in order to 
determine the weak and strong characteristics that affect the resource curse. The thesis 
emphasizes three steps levels of the value chain that are not necessarily sequential: 1) 
sector organization and contract awards; 2) collection of taxes and royalties; and 3) 
revenue distribution and public investment management.17  
Sector organization and contract awards, which are an upstream part of the value 
chain, cover core policies to regulate the relationship between government and private 
investors, including their legal framework, type of resource ownership, allocation of 
exploration, production, or extraction rights, and the capacity of sector agencies. Stability 
in the legal and regulatory environment allows “principles of simplicity, clarity, and 
predictability” in the sector.18  
Collection of taxes and royalties, midstream in the value chain, includes policy 
and administration of the revenue from the sector. A “good enough” fiscal regime should 
be based on the links between transparency, credibility, and commitment of the actors, 
and profit-based taxes are the best mechanism to obtain revenue.19 Policy stability is 
essential to the sector’s development. As Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon noted, 
16 Ibid., 58. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Ibid., 78. 
19 Ibid., 158. 
 8 
                                                 
when the laws and regulations are in constant change, skittish investors stay out of the 
sector.20 
Returning to Barma’s analyses, revenue distribution and public investment 
management, which are downstream on the chain, are heavily dependent on domestic 
taxation, since they tie state and citizenry through mutual demand. Terry Karl described 
the effect of tax generation on policy. The way the state generates taxes shapes its public 
policies. If government is not dependent on taxation from non-resource development 
sectors, its incentive for a development-oriented policy is lessened. If it is more 
dependent on taxation from these sectors, taxpayers have the ability to control and 
demand the quality and amount of the government’s spending. Moreover, citizens will be 
able to limit inefficient, unplanned, non-development oriented expenditure.21 A 
government that is unable to positively manage the previously mentioned steps of the 
value chain becomes resource dependent.   
C. REGIME TYPE  
Another strand of the resource curse literature debates the relationship between 
resource dependence and democracy, with some scholars arguing that resource wealth 
can support democracy, and others arguing that it weakens democracy. Michael Ross, 
“Does Oil Hinder Democracy” argued that mineral exports have an “antidemocratic 
effect,” and economic dependence on resource rents is closely associated with 
authoritarian governments.22 He explained three “causal mechanisms to the 
antidemocratic effect.” First, the “rentier effect” enables governments of resource-rich 
countries to alleviate democratic pressures by setting taxation at very low rates; second, 
through the “repression effect” governments spend resource rents to build up internal 
security to protect them and suppress democratic movements; and third, under the 
20 Henning Bohn and T. Robert Deacon, “Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural 
Resources,” The American Economic Review 90, no. 3 (2000). 
21 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, 190. 
22 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 18. 
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“modernization effect,” economic development does not create the social and cultural 
changes that bring about democratization.23 
Without ignoring that democratic effects will be weaker in developing countries 
that are economically dependent on the rents, Thad Dunning discovered that oil rents can 
positively influence democracy.24 He theorized that elites potentially can strengthen 
democracy at less cost when they have lower need for redistribution of non-resource 
rents.25 
Frankel attempted to resolve this debate by disputing the common claim that 
economic growth and democracy are always correlated. He further stated that “some 
correlate of democracy—rule of law, political stability, openness to international trade, 
equality of economic endowments and opportunities will tend to be good for economic 
growth. But each of these variables can exist without democracy.”26  
Anca M. Cotet and Kevin K. Tsui offer a conditional theory of the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and democracy, positing that leaders of oil-rich countries 
are expected to act repressively in order to weaken their political contestants, and this 
repression creates nondemocratic regimes. However, this is conditional: if, after 
discovering mineral wealth, the regime is already democratic, then wealth does not 
damage democracy; however, if the regime starts out weak or non-democratic, then 
wealth hinders the transition to democracy.27    
D. CONFLICT  
The political economy literature on natural resources also includes the finding that 
domestic conflicts, be they violent or non-violent, adversely affect the relationship 
between natural resources and economic development. Elites and factions are more likely 
23 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (April 2001), 327–36. 
24 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
25 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 46. 
26 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 18. 
27 Anca M. Cotet and Kevin K. Tsui, “Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence 
Really Show?” http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1347700, 24. 
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to battle over valuable resources instead of supporting labor and capital investment to the 
sector.28 Michael Ross claims that the most common cause of conflict is unequal 
distribution of resource wealth, and if the conflict becomes more serious and violent, it 
deters investment in sectors other than minerals, such as agriculture and manufacturing, 
which could bring growth in equitable forms. He also claims that resource extraction 
causes low-level violence, though it is not always raised to larger civil war. Capital-
intensive extraction has more probability to ignite separatist rebellion, for it brings less 
benefit to locals and more benefit to the government and investors. Conversely, labor-
intensive extraction is less likely to provoke secession.29  
Scholars, such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Richard Snyder and Ravi 
Bhavnani, and Macartan Humphreys agree that political leaders of resource-dependent 
countries are finding it possible to fund weapons and war with rents from the resource 
sector.30 However, Cotet and Tsui argue that resource rents can help prevent conflicts 
when authoritarian leaders in resource-rich countries strengthen their military in order to 
deter opponents,31 or they can buy off potential challengers and avoid civil conflict.32   
E. PREVENTING THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Scholars recommend various methods to prevent or mitigate the resource curse. 
They agree that enacting transparent and accountable policy, in particular, through an 
unambiguous and nondiscretionary legal and regulatory framework for the sector is 
essential.33 Furthermore, it is crucial to establish a natural resource fund, ensure 
diversification of the economy, and distribute revenues from natural resources directly to 
the population. Yet, as Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong argue, the potential 
28 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 14. 
29 Michael R. Ross,”Mineral, Wealth, Conflict and Equitable Development,” in Institutional Pathways 
to Equity: Addressing Inequality Traps, ed. Anthony Bebbington, Anis A. Dani, Arjan de Haan, and 
Michael Walton (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 212.  
30 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 46. 
31 Cotet and Tsui, “Oil and Conflict: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?” 24. 
32 Barma et al., Rents to Riches, 46. 
33 Naazneen H. Barma, “Petroleum, Governance and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in 
Postconflict States,” in Beyond the Resource Curse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 
336.  
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benefit of these methods is extremely dependent on the level of institutional capacity. The 
concern is that developing, resource-rich countries lack the necessary capacity, and they 
are not able to build qualified institutions in a short time; sometimes, therefore, a release 
of the state’s direct control over the resource rents is desirable, along with privatization of 
the sector to domestic owners who are capable of demanding strong institutions.34 
Richard Pomfret, however, asserts that this domestic privatization approach can hold the 
demand for economic reform back and affect the stagnation of productivity.35 
When leaders make decisions on natural resource processing, they base these 
decisions upon the “availability of alternative sources of export revenue” and “the level 
of political contestation”36 according to Jones Luong and Weinthal. Yet, the leaders do 
not always keep both political and economic balance. In this context, political elites 
should take responsibility for the curse, because these deteriorating characteristics are 
caused by government’s mismanagement and institutionally weak capacity,37 which are 
more likely, in turn, to lead to potential conflicts as well as an increasingly authoritarian 
regime. 
Considering these various methods to avoid the resource curse, the governments 
of resource-rich, and developing countries need to strengthen governance and 
institutional quality of the sector and develop specific policy for the country.  
34 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, “Combating the Resource Curse: Alternative Solution to 
Managing Mineral Wealth,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (2006), 46–47. 
35 Richard Pomfret, Resource Management and Transition in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia 
(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 7.  
36 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse: Explaining Oil and Gas 
Development Strategies in the Soviet Successor States and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 34 
(2001).  
37 Andrew Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey, Working Paper 
268, Institute of Development Studies (UK: University of Sussex, April 2006), 15. 
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III. CORRELATION BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
This chapter focuses on the governance and institutional quality of the Mongolian 
mining sector, which is the intervening variable of the thesis. Through the application of 
the natural resource management value chain framework, this chapter evaluates how 
Mongolia’s governance and institutional quality and its resource curse are associated, 
with an emphasis on the following three steps:  
1) sector organization and contract awards,  
2) collection of taxes and royalties, and  
3)  revenue distribution and public investment management.   
To determine potential weaknesses and strengths of governance and institutions 
that may stimulate the resource curse, this chapter begins with the definitions of 
governance and institutions in the context of the political economy. The World Bank 
defines governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised,”38 and uses a conceptual tool called the “World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)” to assess governance and institutional framework. According to the WGI, 
governance includes: “(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them.”39  
According to Douglass North, “institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society…, and they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic.”40 Barma and her co-authors explain institutions in the context of the natural 
resource sector as follows: “Laws and regulations on the natural resource sectors, 
operational and fiscal procedures for the transfer from resource-rich areas to resource 
38 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and World Bank, 2010). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
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poor can be formal institutions. Informal institutions can be publicly accepted, but not 
legally adopted rules that structure the behaviors.”41  
In mineral-rich countries, the capacity of the natural resource sector can be a 
reflection of not only the sector’s but also the state’s overall governance and institutional 
quality. The current governance and institutions of Mongolia were founded in the 
political and social environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990, 
Mongolia started its peaceful transformation from a heavily centralized and state-led 
political economy to a democratic and open-market regime. This change allowed 
enormous progress, facilitating political freedom, the first democratic election and a 
multi-party parliamentary system, and the first democratic constitution. However, the 
former regime had been in place for 70 years, so the state encountered numerous political 
and economic challenges. Experiencing successes and failures, the state has gradually 
established the current legal and institutional framework.     
A. SECTOR ORGANIZATION AND CONTRACT AWARDS (UPSTREAM 
LEVEL OF THE VALUE CHAIN) 
In this section, within sector organization and contract awards that are the 
upstream level of the natural resource management value chain, core policies to regulate 
the relationship between the actors of the sector are covered. The sector regulatory 
framework provides the government and investors with guidelines to deal with political, 
economic, and social challenges, and potential risks in the extractive industries.42 In order 
to make an assessment of institutional quality through the sector organization and 
contract awards step, this thesis relies on four dimensions used in Rents to Riches?: a) 
“legal and regulatory framework of the sector; b) type of ownership; c) allocation of 
exploration and extraction rights; and d) capacity of the sector agencies.”43 
41 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 9. 
42 Ibid., 77.  
43 Ibid. 
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1. Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Typically, rules of law shape the effectiveness and efficiency of the governance of 
any sector. Due to the natural resource sector’s potential impact on the country’s 
economic, social, and environmental status, key decisions regarding sector management 
are often made at the constitutional level.44 Mongolia’s economic growth has become 
extremely dependent on the natural resource sector. For example, 22 percent of GDP, 61 
percent of industrial value added, and 94 percent of export earnings come from the 
mining industry (Figure 1).45 Therefore, the legal and regulatory environment of the 
Mongolian mining sector plays a significant role in whether or not the country suffers 
from the resource curse.  
 
Figure 1.  Mining Share of Mongolia’s Economy (From National Statistical 
Office of Mongolia, 2013). 
This section covers the key institutions, along with the primary laws, that impact 
the development of the mining sector while attempting to determine the best practices for 
governance and institutions. The best practices include clear and consistent legal and 
44 Nicolas Hayson and Sean Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources for Peace: Ownership, Control and 
Wealth-Sharing,” Briefing Paper (2009), 8.  
45 Otgochuluu Chuluuntseren, “Mongolia’s Mineral Future and Development,” Ministry of Mining of 
Mongolia, http://www.exportmongolia.mn/userfiles/Otgochuluu-UUYam.pdf, 6.  
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regulatory standards, which enable consistent expectations of the sector, along with a 
transparent and nondiscretionary framework to allocate exploration and extraction 
rights.46 These characteristics facilitate steady development of the sector that is 
independent of the political influence by particular parties or fractions.  
The Parliament of Mongolia has adopted core laws on minerals, and it scrutinizes 
the operations of the government, which is the body in charge of regulating the sector’s 
procedure. The key sector institutions are the Ministry of Mining and the Ministry of 
Finance. The former has a wide range of responsibilities in developing and implementing 
the laws and regulations related to minerals. It is also engaged in processes, such as 
decision making on critical issues related to the sector, allocation of mining licenses, and 
performance of surveys and research. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the state 
and local budget planning and expenditure, as well as customs, taxation, and insurance 
policies.47  
Mongolia has made some efforts to improve the legal and regulatory environment 
of the sector, resulting in both positive and negative consequences. A consistent and 
predictable legal and regulatory environment creates a favorable operational environment 
among the actors, such as policy makers, public servants, and investors. Furthermore, the 
rules and regulations based on the laws produce significant implications on how the 
actors will act at each step of the natural resource management value chain, from the 
exploration to distribution of the resources.48 The Mongolian Parliament issued its first 
“Mineral Law” to regulate activities and relations between the mining and socio-
economic environmental sectors in 1997. This law established a positive atmosphere 
among the actors and created an investor friendly business environment. It allowed the 
first-come, first-served opportunity for mineral licenses and kept stability for almost 10 
46 Barma, “Petroleum, Governance and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in Post Conflict 
States” (2012), 336.   
47 InfoMongolia, “Ministries of Mongolia,” 
http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/169/138/Ministries%20of%20Mongolia. 
48 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 85. 
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years. Therefore, it contributed to the attractiveness of the sector and constantly increased 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).49 
Governments of resource-rich developing countries can be extremely susceptible 
to inconsistent legal acts, because irrational and frequent changes in laws and regulations 
may decrease the reliability of not only the regulatory environment of the sector, but also 
the state and governance. It may also weaken transparency of policies and result in 
ineffective law enforcement, which badly erodes the quality of institutions. Such 
regulatory gaps would be more complicated and harmful as they continue without 
improvement.50  
The 1997 Mineral Law was revised in 2006 and amended in July 2009; however, 
experts affirm that the amendment created backsliding and an unfavorable operational 
environment for investors due to the increased tax and regulatory burden on them, as well 
as the overall uncertainty introduced by an unstable and unpredictable legal framework 
for the sector.51 The amendment also included a new type of mineral resource called the 
“strategic deposit.” Such a deposit is defined as one that can influence national security 
and economic development, for it has capacity of producing more than 5 percent of the 
country’s total annual GDP.52 Regardless of the intended improvement purpose, the 
changes resulted in a substantial decrease in investments and license activities.  
The Law on Prohibition of Mineral Exploration and Mining Activities in River 
Basins, Water Reservoir Areas, and Forested Areas, commonly known as the Long 
Named Law, was enacted in 2009 in order to secure the ecology and environment from 
the damage caused by the mining activities.53 The law, generally, was appreciated by the 
49 Christian Packard and Odmaa Khurelbold, “The Changing Legal Environment for Mining in 
Mongolia,” http://www.anallp.com/the-changing-legal-environment-for-mining-in-mongolia-2/. 
50 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 85.  
51 Robert Shapiro, “Economic Modernization in Mongolia: The Impact of Tax and Regulatory Policies 
on the Mining Sector,” http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Report_Mongolian_Mining-Shapiro-
Jan2009.pdf, 3. 
52 PWC, “Doing Business Guide in Mongolia 2012–2013,” 
http://www.pwc.com/en_MN/mn/publication/assets/dbg_2012.pdf, 13. 
53 N. Erdenesaikhan, Mongolia National Report on Sustainable Development for the 18th Session of 
the Commission on SD (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Nature, Environment and Tourism of Mongolia, February 
2010), 15.  
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local populace, for its intention was to protect the environment. The government 
reviewed 1,782 mining licenses and revoked 254 alluvial gold mining licenses in 
response to the law.54 However, this environmentally beneficial effort reduced the 
investors’ reliance on the mining sector. In 2009, the government passed another new law 
to create a separate legal environment for uranium mining from the other types of mining. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Mongolia was established as an executive agency in 
charge of uranium-related procedures. Under the law, the new agency revoked existing 
licenses of uranium exploration and mining, and required the license holders to get their 
licenses re-registered. In November 2010, the agency stated that the revoked licenses 
would not be restored.55 These changes in the legal environment represent the 
government’s inability to equally satisfy the actors of the sector while it launches new 
laws and policies. According to the Fraser Institute’s Annual Mining Survey for 
2009‒2010, Mongolia received only 19 scores out of 100 for the Mining Policy Potential 
Index, “the third-lowest score issued for any jurisdiction.”56  
In 2006, the Law on Windfall Profit Tax contributed to the decline of the 
previously attractive environment due to the increased tax, set at 68 percent, on copper 
and gold production,57 and the law was abolished in January, 2011. [The 2006 
amendments are further discussed later in this chapter.] This was evidence to prove the 
researchers’ argument that the governments of many natural resource-rich countries tend 
to renege on previous agreements when the world price increases. Such a “dynamic 
inconsistency” problem happens under political pressures, and it discourages foreign 
companies and investors.58  
Decisions associated with the extractive industry are made by the politicians at 
higher levels, for the industry brings huge amounts of income which has the ability to 
impact the entire country. However, excessive involvement of the politicians in the 
54 M.A.D., The Mongolian Real State Report (August 2013).  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Shapiro, “Economic Modernization in Mongolia” (2009), 3. 
58 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 26. 
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executive branch’s operation damages the government’s ability to pursue consistent and 
reliable policy in the sector. Since the early 1990s, Mongolia has experienced 
inconsistency among the political parties in power as well as among members of the 
government. The frequent change of the governments negatively affects long-term 
policies, because the new government in power always seeks to neglect and end the 
policies that were initiated by the previous government.59 The government, furthermore, 
makes decisions in favor of its political gain, which erodes the quality of transparency 
and enforcement of laws; poor decisions yield corruption and unfair competition in the 
sector.  
2. Type of Ownership  
As Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal argue, decisions on the ownership 
type are very much dependent on the degree of access to alternative sources of export 
revenue and the level of political contestation.60 Because of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, oil-rich countries that had previously either been within the USSR emerged as 
significant players in the global energy sector, and they chose different policies of sector 
development regardless of their inherited similarities under the Soviets. Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan sustained full state ownership and banned direct international 
involvement, whereas Kazakhstan pursued a complete privatization policy and allowed 
foreign investors to buy the most of its oil and gas enterprises that previously were owned 
by the state.61  
Mongolia, having an experience similar to those countries in the way of obtaining 
its freedom of choice for the mining sector, made its own decisions. It was legitimized by 
the Mineral Law of Mongolia stipulating that “mineral resources naturally found on and 
under the earth’s surface in Mongolia are the properties of the State. Therefore, the state, 
as the owner, has the right to grant exploration and mining rights.”62 As a consequence of 
59 Reeves, “Development Planning in Mongolia: Failure and Potential” (2014). 
60 Luong and Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse: Explaining Oil and Gas Development 
Strategies in the Soviet Successor States and Beyond” (2001), 369.   
61 Ibid. 
62 Laws of Mongolia, “Minerals Law of Mongolia,” http://amcham.mn/laws/minerals%20law.pdf.  
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transformation from the state-led economy to open market system, privatization of the 
state-owned mining companies started in Mongolia. By 2010, approximately 28 percent 
of all companies were engaged in the mining business, according to the Mongolian stock 
exchange.63 Currently, over 200 foreign and joint-venture companies are engaged in 
mining activity in Mongolia.64 
According to Luong and Weinthal, if the degree of alternative sources of export 
revenue is higher and the level of contestation is lower, the leaders are less constrained 
about choosing policy. Conversely, if there is a lower degree of alternative sources and 
higher degree of contestation, there is more constriction.65 In the initial period of the 
regime change, Mongolia did not have a high level of contestation of different ethnicities 
or groups competing over ideology, wealth, territory, or political power. However, there 
is a tendency for the state to seek more involvement in the management of the natural 
resource sector when more wealth from natural resources is explored.  
This part of the thesis examines the relative effects of state and private ownership 
on the sector. The Mongolian government established a state-owned mining company, 
“Erdenes MGL,” in 2007, and it represents the state’s interest in strategic and state-
funded deposits. It also holds “special permission to explore and develop strategic and 
state funded deposits, make reserve evaluations, and manage the mineral assets owned by 
the state in order to own state stakes of strategic deposits.”66 Establishment of state-
owned enterprises could guarantee long term, sustainable ownership policies, encourage 
capable conglomerates that efficiently coordinate the operations of the subsidiary,” and 
prevent major policy changes that could negatively affect the sector.67 Some economic 
63 World Bank, “Mongolia Economic Update 2013,” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/11/06/mongolia-economic-update-november-2013.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Luong and Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse: Explaining Oil and Gas Development 
Strategies in the Soviet Successor States and Beyond,” (2001): 375.  
66 News.mn, “Government-Owned Shares of ‘Erdenet’ Transferred to ‘Erdenes MGL,’” 
http://english.news.mn/content/166078.shtml.  
67 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 90.  
 20 
                                                 
analysts and Mongolian politicians have stated that the significant growth of the GDP is a 
result of a successful state-led development plan for the mining industry.68  
Mining sector experts tend to emphasize that private ownership is more efficient 
than state ownership.69 Yet the Mongolian state has increased its involvement in the 
mining sector through the exploitation of strategically important deposits. According to 
the Mineral Law of Mongolia, “the state may have up to 50 percent participation interest, 
and 34 percent of investment shares depending on how much investment the state itself 
made in the exploitation stage.”70 The Oyu Tolgoi Mine, for example, determined the 
reserves, and the Mongolian state now owns a 34 percent stake. Some economists argue 
that the legal provision, which allows state involvement in the management of and 
revenue stream from strategic deposits, erodes private companies’ capacity. The private 
companies function more efficiently if they have full responsibility over the operations. 
Many other countries have shared a similar experience that a high level of the state 
ownership weakens the sector by contributing to “high costs, over-employment, above 
market pay, and low productivity.”71    
Weinthal and Jones Luong argue that under state ownership, the government does 
not encourage strong institutions that could challenge the government impacting its fiscal 
autonomy and power to make decisions.72 Therefore, they suggest that domestic private 
ownership would be better to increase the institutions’ capacity. According to this logic, 
the state should not be worried about exploration and extraction processes under private 
ownership; in turn, this enables the state to concentrate more on its institutional 
68 Reeves, “Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance: Can Mongolia Avoid the ‘Resource Curse’?” 
(2011), 179. 
69 Otgochuluu Chuluuntseren, “Mongolia’s Mineral Future and Development,” Ministry of Mining of 
Mongolia, http://www.exportmongolia.mn/userfiles/Otgochuluu-UUYam.pdf.   
70 Shapiro, “Economic Modernization in Mongolia: The Impact of Tax and Regulatory Policies on the 
Mining Sector” (2009), 3. 
71 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 90.  
72 Weinthal and Jones Luong, “Combating the Resource Curse: Alternative Solution to Managing 
Mineral Wealth” (2006), 43. 
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establishment, which ultimately enables the government to extract profits not only from 
the extractive industry, but also from the other sources of income.73  
In order to put a smooth managerial process of the sector in place, a boundary 
between the main actors should be clear. Under state ownership, the border between the 
state elites and assigned bureaucrats to run the companies is blurred, because they lack 
clearly acknowledged principals. On the contrary, private domestic ownership clarifies 
this border, for the state and private sectors have their own administrative and managerial 
rules.74 Reduction in state ownership and increase in private ownership discourage the tie 
between political leaders and private investors.  
3. Allocation of Exploration and Extraction Rights  
The most common forms of allocation of rights are direct negotiation between the 
state and producers, and criteria-based licensing. The first form can reduce government 
rigidity while the second can develop transparency and efficiency.75 In order to have a 
good governmental and institutional setting for awarding exploration and extraction 
rights, the policies on contracts and licenses should be transparent, not complicated, and 
nondiscretionary.76  
The fundamental legal and regulatory framework for the procedures of granting 
exploration and extraction rights in the mining sector was set up by the Mining Law, 
which was enacted in 1997. According to the law, the mineral licenses were granted on a 
first-come first-served basis, a low taxation and royalty burden was imposed on investors, 
and more importantly, a stable and predictable legal environment was present. For almost 
ten years, the law provided a stable and predictable operational environment and boosted 
the growth of the mining sector until the 2006 amendment.77 Consequently, new mining 
applications were suspended for nine months and created an inconsistent situation. Even 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 44. 
75 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 94. 
76 Barma, “Petroleum, Governance and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in Post Conflict 
States” (2012), 336. 
77 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 86. 
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though the government started accepting applications, the activities could not reach the 
level of the booming period prior to the amendment (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Evolution of Mining Applications (green line) and Granted Licenses 
(orange line) in Mongolia, 1997‒2008 (From Mineral Rights Cadaster, 
The World Bank Team, 2009). 
According to the law, two types of licenses, exploration and mining, are granted 
to legal persons, taxpayers in Mongolia, and actors that operate under the laws of 
Mongolia. Yet, lacking detailed regulations and established requirements for the 
companies and individuals to obtain exploration and extraction licenses, until recently the 
sector allowed many unincorporated applicants to accumulate licenses for re-sale for 
much higher prices than they were initially bought. As more mineral resources were 
discovered, such license dealings were amplified and yielded enormous rent-seeking 
possibilities. By the August 2012, there were already 1,096 mining licenses and an 
additional 3,450 exploration licenses, according to Ministry of Mineral Resources and 
Energy.78  
Moreover, anyone, even those without professional experience and knowledge of 
the sector could conduct mining activities,79 which slowed down the progress in sector 
development and ultimately created enormous negative consequences on the environment 
78 Ernst & Young, “Mongolia Mining and Tax Guide 2012/13,” 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Mongolia_Mining_and_Tax_Guide_-
_2012_2013/$FILE/Mongolia%20Mining%20and%20Tax%20Guide%20-%202012_2013.pdf, 12.  
79 Ibid. 
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and people’s behavior. In order to correct the regulatory gap, the government decided to 
stop issuing new licenses in 2010,80 and it has not yet started accepting applications for 
new licenses. The Mongolian Law on the Licensing for Business Activity was approved 
in 2002. According to the law, agreement with the governors of local administrations is 
needed for the applicants in order to meet a requirement to apply for the rights.81 If the 
government and agency have a clear cadastral plan and registration, this interfering step 
in the licensing procedure could be eliminated. Clear and unbiased legal and regulatory 
environment facilitates the smooth operation at this step.  
If there is a lack of transparency and institutional restraints, allocation of rights 
becomes extremely susceptible to corruption.82 Due to gaps in the regulatory 
environment, the sector produces poor quality contracts, and the government can make 
contracts on the basis of its own preference and benefit. In turn, the sector companies 
seek to negotiate with the government in order to maximize their company profits,83 and 
such circumstances then damage transparency and increase corruption in the sector. 
According to the Transparency International and the World Bank’s Governance 
Indicator, corruption in Mongolia had worsened between 2001 and 2006. The result of 
the firm-level survey conducted for 62 countries shows that Mongolia ranks 9 out of 
these 62 countries in terms of firms reporting corruption as a main obstacle to their 
growth.84 The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper also presents that Mongolian 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector scored much lower than 
most other East Asian countries on the indicator of the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment.85  
80 Ibid.  
81 Enrique Ortega Girones, Alexsandra Pugachevski, and Gotthard Walser, “Mineral Rights Cadaster,” 
in Extractive Industries for Development Series, no. 4 (2009), 63.  
82 Marie Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia,” 
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/354_Corruption_in_natural_resources_manageme
nt__Mongolia.pdf, 3.  
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 32. 
85 Elena Ianchovichina and Sudarshan Gooptu, Growth Diagnostics for a Resource-Rich Transition 
Economy: The Case of Mongolia (The World Bank, 2007), 32. 
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The government, however, has made some progress on modifying the weaker 
areas associated with the allocation of exploration and production rights. In order to 
improve the legal and regulatory environment, the government is reviewing processes to 
issue new licenses and contracts, and establishing some requirements to limit the transfer 
of existing licenses. Moreover, it has conducted an assessment defining and publicly 
announcing the areas where minerals are abundant as an effort to promote transparency.86 
Mongolia has participated in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
since 2005 and was designated as EITI Compliant in 2010. 
4. Capacity of the Sector Agencies 
Capacity of the sector agencies is dependent on the state’s ability to define its 
institutional mandates without overlaps, and to assure a collaborative environment.87 A 
shortage of effective coordination among the agencies results in poor management and 
regulation of the sector,88 which deepens the resource curse. Lacking a long-term, 
national level policy, the governments of resource-rich developing countries create a gap 
in the legal and operational environment of its agencies. The gap further generates 
overlap and contradiction among the responsibilities of various agencies, and increases 
misperception and inefficiency,89 which ultimately spoil the overall capacity of 
governance.  
Conditions to weaken natural resource sector capacity, like any other key state 
sectors, are caused by political and economic challenges. The political environment of 
Mongolia severely affects the quality of the sector. Decisions made at a high political 
level should be long term and unified for the benefit of the citizens. Nevertheless, it has 
been common that the political decisions are made in the interest of different political 
parties to defend the business which is their source of power (patronage).  
86 World Bank, “Mongolia Economic Update 2013,” 30.  
87 Barma, “Petroleum, Governance and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in Post Conflict 
States” (2012), 336. 
88 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 98.  
89 Reeves, “Development Planning in Mongolia: Failure and Potential” (2014). 
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A constitutional amendment in 2000 allowed Mongolian parliament members to 
hold multiple positions in government simultaneously. This decision has eroded the 
separation of power and the checks and balances between the Mongolian legislative and 
executive branches. Furthermore, it has diminished the public confidence in the state, and 
weakened the accountability for both the legislative and executive branches. The current 
government of Mongolia is formed with 19 ministers, 17 of whom are parliament 
members. The public has widely criticized the parliament for abandoning its major 
responsibility to adopt competent laws and lacking the power to scrutinize operations by 
the government. A further consequence is that government service has become a 
formation of interest groups that seek profit from the state, and allocate social wealth 
among individuals by appointing them to the main positions regardless of their 
experience and skill in the field. In other words, the government service which is pledged 
by the corrupted political and business factions has become an obstacle rather than a 
springboard for the development of the state and private sectors; moreover, it contributes 
to inequality and injustice in the society, which results in the government crisis or 
decline.90   
Economically, as many other post-communist countries, Mongolia experienced “a 
blurred line between economic and political elites that often have widespread conflicts of 
interest. These conflicts of interest are compounded by ineffective governmental 
oversight bodies (U.S. Department of State, 2011).”91 In 2005, between 50 to 70 percent 
of the parliament members already had businesses, and there were government ministers 
who had business interests in their directly mandated sectors.”92 Such interlinkages 
between the government and business have expanded as emerging conglomerates have 
built close ties with the government. According to the 2013 Resource Governance Index 
introduced by the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), the quality of Mongolian governance 
in the mining sector achieved a “partial” score of 51 out of 100 score, and ranked 26 out 
of 58 countries. For the criteria of Reporting practices (a score of 39), Safeguard and 
90 Mijiddorj Batchimeg, “Бид Төөрчихсөн Хүмүүс Биш ээ,” (We Are Not Lost People), 
http://politics.news.mn/content/157994.shtml#.UkzKT0W0XTY.twitter. 
91 Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia” (2012), 8. 
92 Ibid., 7. 
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Quality Controls (49), and Enabling Environment (49), Mongolia received partial and 
failing scores.  
These challenges stemming from the political and economic environment are 
followed by corruption that damages the quality and effectiveness of the sector 
agencies.93 The World Governance Indicators measured by the World Bank present 
similar results as the RWI, assessing that the government effectiveness and controls of 
corruption are the most fragile areas of the Mongolian governance capacity. The latest 
discoveries of enormous mineral wealth brought a risk to the sector capacity, for “the 
nature of high-level corruption becomes more predatory with political elites attempting to 
take control over private companies and consolidating the public and private sectors.”94 
This type of corruption undermines the likelihood of successful, long-lasting planning for 
the sector as the politicians advance their individual interests over those of society. While 
recent legislation aimed at limiting the conflict of interests between politicians and 
businessmen is seeking to break this cycle, the relations between the two groups still is a 
defining factor of Mongolia’s political system since its transition to democracy.95  
B. COLLECTION OF TAX AND ROYALTIES (MIDSTREAM LEVEL OF 
THE VALUE CHAIN) 
At the midstream level of the natural resource value chain, “the relationship 
between the state and resource developers changes to one where, instead of a resource 
developer acting (at least in part) as an extractive agent for the state, the state takes on the 
role of collecting taxes from developers. The state, also, plays important monitoring and 
inspection roles.”96 There is a tendency for a linkage between the government and 
citizens to become weaker in resource-rich countries. In other words, when the state is 
able to collect “guaranteed”97 revenue from the natural resources sector, a higher degree 
93 NRGI, “Resource Governance Index 2013: Mongolia,” 
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/rgi/report.  
94 Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia” (2012), 8. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 42. 
97 Mick Moore, “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing 
Countries,” in International Political Science Review 25, no. 3 (2004). 
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of autonomy between the government and citizens is created due to that income. The 
main reason is that the government, relying on the other sources of revenue, does not 
impose effective taxes on its citizens. Since the citizens are not taxed by the state, they do 
not adequately consider the government’s activities and scrutinize the state.98 This 
section of the thesis will examine some of the political economic factors which determine 
the Mongolian tax regime of the natural resource sector, focusing on the legal 
background, transparency, and competency of the sector policies.   
In order to meet the requirements for the newly adapted market economy system, 
which started right after the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union and its economic 
support, the democratically elected government of Mongolia updated the tax laws. The 
first General Law of Taxation, which provides the infrastructure for the overall tax 
regime, was introduced in 1993. It contains general provisions relating to tax and tax 
administration, including the rights and duties of both taxpayers and administrators. The 
other principal tax law that affects the tax payers and actors in the mining sector is the 
Mineral Law of Mongolia of 1997. It includes the provisions specific to the prospecting, 
exploration, and mining of minerals, and imposes royalties on mining license holders. 
The Corporate Income Tax Law and its provisions apply to all companies, and is 
calculated based on total annual profits or revenues made by companies, ranging from 10 
to 25 percent, while the Value Added Tax Law is an indirect tax regime relevant to all 
companies, including miners.99 
In 2006, during the most prosperous years of Mongolian mining, the Mineral Law 
was reviewed and major amendments were made for introducing equity participation to 
the government and increasing the government’s share of mining revenues. Projected 
agreements of investment with major mines were repeatedly delayed due to the potential 
amendments in the legal environment.100 Particularly controversial was the Windfall 
Profits Tax Law, which was passed separately in 2006 and abolished in 2011. According 
98 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “What is the Problem with Natural 
Resource Wealth?” http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/erc01.pdf, 11. 
99 Errnst & Young, Mongolia Mining and Tax Guide 2012/13, 12. 
100 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox, 7–10. 
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to the law, a 68 percent windfall tax was imposed on the profits from the sale of gold and 
copper101—at the time considered the highest royalty tax rate in the world. The tax 
increase was also interpreted as a burden shifted from smaller developers or individuals 
to large mining companies and resource developers. These amendments, which were 
made during the highly profitable period for the sector, increased uncertainty and 
decreased the competitiveness of the sector. In turn, this legislation damaged the 
attractiveness of Mongolian mining in the eyes of inverters. Before the amendment, in the 
Fraser Institute Mining Survey, Mongolia had achieved a score of 54 out of 100 on the 
Index of Policy Potential in 2005 for its overall policy attractiveness, while only 12 and 
19 scores were achieved in 2006 and 2007 after the amendments.102 It ranked 78 out of 
93 counties with its very score low score of 19.5 in 2011‒2012, and the low ranking has 
not improved until now, which demonstrates how easy it is to lose attractiveness, but 
difficult to regain it.103 
Some resource-rich developing countries tend to rely on high levels of 
taxation and regulation, and it applies more to the businesses that involve foreign 
companies. This policy can be suitable on environmental grounds, yet it also can 
discourage output and foreign involvement as demonstrated by the experiences of the 
populist nationalism of Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela.104 Since 75 percent of 
exports and 40 percent of revenues of Mongolia are formed by the mining industries,105 
which operate under the investment of domestic, foreign, and joint ventures, 
inconsistency in the legal and regulatory environment of taxation will be a big challenge 
to the government. In other words, tax policy should be favorable to both the state and 
investors.  
101 Packard and Khurelbold, “The Changing Legal Environment for Mining in Mongolia,” 
102 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox, 10. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey, 24. 
105 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox, 1. 
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With the intention to increase the government’s revenue, the amendment to double 
the royalty rate was made in 2006. However, the doubled rate eliminated sector investors 
making the Mongolian extractive industry the highest mineral royalty regime, again.106 
Reduction of foreign direct investment will negatively impact Mongolian development, 
because the government lacks the managerial and financial capacity to operate the high-
cost industry alone. It lacks well-functioning domestic capital markets and access to 
international capital markets. As evidence of the expensive operation of the sector, “60 
percent of the total FDI, which is more than 30 times the percentage that goes towards 
manufacturing and 20 times more than towards construction,” is devoted to the mining 
sector.107   
Moreover, consequences stemming from the amendments show that the level of 
FDI, which is essential to sector operation, is very much susceptible to government 
decisions. In 2012, the Mongolian government received 3.8 billion U.S. dollars in FDI, 
yet it was 4.6 billion in the previous year. A major reason for the sharp decrease was the 
amendment of Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (1993), which was approved in June 
2012. Persistent debates before and after the change in the Strategic Entities Foreign 
Investment Law of Mongolia increased the cautiousness of foreign investors regarding 
the Mongolian investment environment. By November 2013, FDI slumped 50 percent 
due to a prolonged skirmish with the Rio Tinto Group, which is the largest investor in the 
Mongolian mining sector.108 
Due to the decline in FDI and export of some minerals, the overall Mongolian 
economy confronts considerable external imbalances.109 In short, overly optimistic 
changes that were made during the highly profitable period of the sector increased 
investor uncertainty and decreased the sector’s competitiveness.   
106 Shapiro, “Economic Modernization in Mongolia,” 17.  
107 Reeves, “Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance,” 171. 
108 Michael Kohn, “Mongolia Minerals Law Changes may Lead to Lifting of License Ban,” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-21/mongolia-minerals-law-changes-may-lead-to-lifting-of-
license-ban.html.  
109 Asian Development Bank, “Report on Mongolia 2013,” 
http://www.adb.org/countries/mongolia/economy. 
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The level of taxation is dependent on the smooth and profitable operation of the 
companies. Therefore, if there is an interruption in their operation, the revenue stream 
going to the government will be reduced. In short, in order to maximize its tax receipts, 
the government should encourage investments. After the Mongolian Parliament made 
amendments that were more resource developer friendly, including the repeal of the 
Windfall Profits Tax effective on January 2011, some positive results were observed. For 
example, the investment agreement of one of the biggest mining projects, “Oyu Tolgoi,” 
was finally signed in September 2009. A report issued by the Mongolian Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative in 2012 shows that the increase of mining and oil 
activity in recent years has resulted in significant improvement in tax revenue from 
extractive companies. The tax revenue increased 66 percent between 2010 and 2011, 
reflecting the rapid influx of investment into this sector.110 
Taxes and revenues from selling the mineral resources are collected and divided 
by the state. According to the EITI Mongolia report, there are more than 100 government 
entities that accept payments from the mining companies in Mongolia, and the 
government lacks a centralized, systematic way to keep track of these taxes and revenues. 
Different ministries, agencies, provinces, and sub-provinces can collect the government 
receipts; consequently, substantial amounts of revenue can be left out of reports by the 
tax authority and therefore could be illegally spent and distributed. This also suggests that 
respected central and local authorities lack efficient coordination of rules and 
responsibilities to track and monitor taxes and revenues.111  
Collection of revenue is process that is highly vulnerable to corruption, especially 
under an overly complex regulatory system and inadequate administration. According to 
the World Bank/IFC enterprise survey 2009 result, 20 percent of the firms interviewed 
expected to bribe tax officials in Mongolia during the course of their business 
transactions. Perhaps even more worrisome,  revenue collection can become a bridge for 
businesses to establish close ties with government officials, which, in turn, increases the 
110 Errnst & Young, “Mongolia Mining and Tax Guide 2012/13,” 4. 
111 EITI, “Mongolia Seventh EITI Reconciliation Report - 2012,” http://eiti.org/files/Mongolia-2012-
EITI-Report.pdf.  
 31 
                                                 
risk of utilizing the collected revenues for private or political benefit.112 Having a 
comparatively small population, Mongolia is very vulnerable to this risk.  
C. REVENUE DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT (DOWNSTREAM 
LEVEL OF THE VALUE CHAIN) 
At the downstream level of the natural resource value chain, revenue distribution 
and management, “the state-society relationship again comes into play, with the state as 
the agent charged with making sustainable, developmentally oriented savings, 
consumption, and investment decisions on behalf of society.”113 This section will focus 
on whether the Mongolian government manages distribution of revenues from the natural 
resource sector in an effective and transparent way for the benefit of all citizens. At the 
same time, it will focus on the Mongolian government’s ability to balance between the 
current development needs and the need to accumulate the wealth that it will invest in its 
future generations.  
“An effective public investment system is essential for avoiding the Dutch disease 
and for translating natural resources underground into productive assets above 
ground.”114 Many resource-rich countries encounter difficulties on how to put rents and 
royalties from natural resources into the useful assets that are able to substitute for the 
extracted nonrenewable natural capital, while effectively managing the expenditure and 
minimizing detrimental impacts of the resource revenues on other sectors.115 To ease 
these challenges, “the countries must weigh decisions on intertemporal consumption 
versus saving, while considering politically charged, present-day demands as well.”116  
Due to its mining industry boom, the Mongolian economy has grown rapidly. 
Over the years, mining revenues have accounted for almost 30 to 40 percent of GDP. 
Today, the mining sector alone collects one-third of the government revenue (Figure 3, 
112 Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia” (2012), 4–5. 
113 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 42. 
114 Zahid Hasnain, Incentive Compatible Reforms: The Political Economy of Public Investments in 
Mongolia (The World Bank [2011]), 2.  
115 Barma et al., Rents to Riches?, 65. 
116 Ibid., 169. 
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Figure 4.) While benefiting from the huge revenue, the country has experienced 
symptoms of Dutch disease and has become heavily dependent on the mining sector. 
Therefore, the government must enable a good quality of public spending and saving in 
order to allow an exclusive opportunity to transform the development prospects in the 
country. 
 
Figure 3.  Economic Performance, 2002‒2013 (From Ministry of Finance of 
Mongolia, 2014). 
 
Figure 4.  Mining Contributions to Mongolian Budget Revenues (From 
Ministry of Finance of Mongolia, 2014). 
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Public spending of mineral rents reached a peak from 2005 to 2008. Experts 
conclude that the excessive domestic spending of revenue surpassed the government’s 
planning and implementation capacity117 (Figure 5), and resulted in overheating of the 
economy. During past years, in order to accumulate wealth from the mining sector and to 
spend it for the developmental purpose, the Mongolian government established the 
Mongolian Development Fund (MDF), which was based on windfall tax revenue from 
gold and copper and budget surplus. The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank 
managed the asset spending to distribute the child money program, which is a cash 
allowance to poor families with 0–18 years old children with the condition that the 
school-age childern should be enrolled at school. The other part of the asset was spent to 
cover the budget deficit, and build wheat and fuel reserves.118  
 
Figure 5.  Budget Performance, 2002‒2013 (From Ministry of Finance of 
Mongolia, 2014). 
117 World Bank, Mongolia: Unbundling the Resource Paradox, 11.  





                                                 
In 2009, the fund was replaced by the Human Development Fund (HDF), mainly 
subsidized by the royalty tax. The fund’s distribution was in the form of cash allowances 
to citizens, as well as payments of tuition fees and other educational and health 
services.119 The main goal of the funds was aimed at efficient use of revenue from 
mining; however, there were problems caused by political influence in the management 
of the funds. The majority of these funds were haphazardly spent as untargeted cash 
allowances (Figure 6) due to political promises the parties had made during the 
parliamentary elections.   
 
Figure 6.  Main Expenditures of Government of Mongolia (From Ministry of 
Finance of Mongolia, 2011). 
Being aware of the neccessity to eliminate negative consequences from 
ineffective expenditures in the previous years, in 2012, leaders of all political parties 
signed a memorundum agreeing not to compete with other parties by giving political 
promises, including a cash distribuiton to the citizens for the purpose of attracting 
constituents. In order to improve the legal framework of public invetsment management 
and fiscal responsibility, the parliament approved the Fiscal Stability Law in 2010. 
Combining the Budget Law of 2002 and the Public Sector Management and Finance 
Law, a new Integrated Budget Law of Mongolia was approved in 2011. The goal of the 
119 Ibid. 
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law was to improve the legal framework of the budgeting system and better align it with 
state-prioritized projects under the Public Investment Program.  
Moreover, the Fiscal Stability Fund (FSF) was set up and put certain limits on the 
power of parliament regarding budget approval. FSF, since its establishment, has 
accumulated 336 billion Tugrugs (equal to 300 million USD) in two consecutive fiscal 
years.120 Establishment of the Treasury Fund was initiated, which should be financed by 
government revenue from the mining sector. The parliament has just discussed its first 
draft, and hopes to begin savings in 2016. At the initial stage of the expenditure, which 
starts in 2025, the government will spend up to 25 percent of the collected fund. At the 
second stage, starting 2050, the Mongolian younger generation will be able to use the 
main savings.121 Taken together, this set of new developments marks a concerted effort 
to improve the downstream rent distribution practices of the Mongolian government, with 
a view to more sustainable and productive investment. 
Effective spending and increased efficiency of revenue collection from the mining 
sector is shaped by “an integrity system that supports the transparent, sustainable, and 
participatory management of natural resources.”122 Overall, in regard to budget 
transparency, the government of Mongolia has made some progress. It has created an e-
budget portal and public access to budget documents through particular publications for 
giving comprehensive information on revenues and expenditures. Mongolia’s score on 
the Open Budget Index has dramatically increased from 18 in the 2006 survey to 60 in 
the 2010 survey, was although it dropped to 51 in 2012. Yet it is still considered above 
the worldwide average.123 Despite the progress, the government still needs further 
improvement in this area, for the current legislature does not provide the public with the 
120 Ibid. 
121 Elena Fehrbach, “The Draft Bill on the Treasury Fund has been Introduced in Mongolia,” 
Mongolia Briefing, http://mongolia-briefing.com/news/2014/02/the-draft-bill-on-the-treasury-fund-has-
been-introduced-in-mongolia.html. 
122 Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia” (2012), 9. 
123 International Budget Partnership, “Open Budget Survey: Mongolia,” 
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf. 
123 Chene, “Corruption in Natural Resource Management in Mongolia” (2012), 9. 
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opportunity to participate in the process through different ways including, for example, 
an open budget discussion. The improvement is becoming more important than before, 
because the government’s expenditure has been increasing rapidly; for example, the 
government spending of 2009 was almost doubled in 2011.124 According to Chene, an 
increasing level of corruption across government sectors is becoming a main obstacle to 
the establishment of a system that ensures transparent and equitable wealth distribution to 
the citizens, while giving importance to sustainable growth rather than short-term 
political considerations.125 The political environment has become one of the factors that 
encourage corruption, and the next chapter will further examine this phenomenon.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid. 
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IV. EFFECTS OF RESOURCE WEALTH ON DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN POLICIES 
Mongolia grasped an opportunity to pursue its own independent, democratic, and 
liberal market policies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990. Nevertheless, 
due to a lack of mature knowledge and experience in the democratic system, Mongolia, 
like the most post-Communist new democracies, has struggled to establish a democracy 
and an open market economic system. The challenge was compounded when huge 
amounts of natural resource deposits were discovered on its territory. This resource 
wealth challenges the state to maintain competent and transparent domestic and foreign 
policies.  
This chapter focuses on the political dynamics around the natural resource sector, 
and assesses why resource-rich countries are likely to experience increased domestic 
instability and a weakened democracy. It also investigates why resource wealth plays a 
critical role in foreign and security policies. Two questions will be considered. First, how 
does the Mongolian political environment affect the management of the natural resource 
sector, which impacts domestic stability and regime type in the long run? Second, how 
can Mongolia manage its resource wealth in a way that promotes its autonomy and 
encourages a beneficial relationship with its neighbors, China and Russia? 
A. REGIME TYPE AND POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT 
To understand the relationship between the resource wealth and regime type, 
which ultimately affects domestic stability, it is important to consider the definitions of 
democracy and authoritarianism. There is no consensus on a single definition of these 
regime types. According to common understanding, at a minimum, democracy should 
include: universal adult suffrage; periodic, free, and fair elections; multiple political 
parties; and alternative source of information.126 Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 
define democracy as follows: “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in 
126 Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy,” CDDRL, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20729/Diamond-Morlino.QoD.intro%28book%29.drft1.pdf.  
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which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting 
indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”127 
An authoritarian regime, on the other hand, is characterized by a strict, top to bottom 
organizational and administrative structure. The regime is not open or accountable to the 
expression of public opinion. An authoritarian regime is defined as a system “…in which 
a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits 
but actually quite predictable ones.”128 Democracy and authoritarianism are thus in part 
distinguished by the degree of relationship between the state and its citizens, implying 
that the stronger the relationship is, the greater the opportunity for democracy and the less 
for authoritarianism.  
This section of the chapter focuses on the impacts of Mongolian resource wealth 
and political environment on its domestic stability and degree of democracy. Under the 
current political economy situation with the resource curse symptoms, Mongolia is more 
susceptible to the deterioration of its young democracy; nevertheless, I believe there is no 
immediate cause for concern about the rise of domestic conflict and civil war.    
Resource-rich developing countries are not predetermined by their resource 
wealth to be democratic or authoritarian; yet, as a general rule, these countries tend to 
experience a deterioration of democracy. Due to mismanagement of resource 
endowments and unequal distribution of wealth, many naturally resource-rich countries 
such as Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria have, or have had, 
undemocratic regimes, and their people suffer from poverty, conflicts, and civil wars.129 
On the other hand, Botswana, Chile, and Malaysia developed policies that promoted 
democracy and reduced inequality among the people through the efficient use of their 
resource wealth.130 The experiences of resource-rich countries demonstrate the following 
relationship between resource wealth and regime type: because of mismanagement of the 
127 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is … and is Not,” Journal of 
Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991), 76.  
128 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2000), 159. 
129 Humphreys et al., “What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” 12. 
130 Ross, “Mineral, Wealth, Conflict and Equitable Development,” 212.  
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natural resource sector, wealthy authoritarian regimes are not likely to pursue 
democratization, while newly developing democratic regimes are likely to weaken their 
immature democratic qualities.131 More democratic and developed countries, by contrast, 
tend to pursue transparent and responsible governance of the sector, which is encouraged 
by sophisticated political institutions.132 An examination of data on 141 countries 
between 1950 and 1990 demonstrates that if a country’s dependence on the natural 
resource increases by as little as 1 percent, its government is likely to increase its 
authoritarian nature by almost 8 percent.133  
Mongolia does not have a long history with democracy, but rather with 
authoritarian rule under a one-party political system, and it is located between the 
authoritarian regime of China and the authoritarian-based regime of Russia. The young 
democracy of Mongolia will be vulnerable to deterioration if the state lacks the 
governance and institutional capabilities to maintain its mineral wealth as an efficient 
source of development. Nevertheless, there are examples of authoritarian regimes 
achieving democracy through smooth transformation based on consistent and long-term 
policies. East Asian authoritarian regimes such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia serve as examples in this regard.  
Mongolian democracy has become more susceptible to deterioration, due to the 
symptoms of the resource curse, which is “a multidimensional phenomenon”134 that is 
associated with socio-economic and political performance. This section focuses on the 
political environment around the natural resources of Mongolia which may eventually 
weaken the country’s democracy and heighten the possibility of domestic instability and 
even civil war. As discussed in the previous chapter, major decisions regarding the 
natural resource sector are made at the parliament level, and the parliament has the power 
131 Humphreys et al., “What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” 12. 
132 Reeves, “Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance: Can Mongolia Avoid the ‘Resource curse’?” 
(2011), 171. 
133 Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A literature Survey (2006), 10. 
134 Ibid., 7. 
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to establish a positive political environment that enables democratic and sound policies to 
translate resource wealth into development and prevent the resource curse.  
Mongolia had a one-party system based on the Soviet-style political and 
governmental institutions for 70 years, until the first multi-party parliamentary system 
was introduced in 1990. Since then, for the first 22 years, power alternated between only 
two major parties, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and Mongolian 
Democratic Party (MDP). In 2011, the Mongolian parliament passed the current Law on 
Election of the Parliament, which enables a mixture of proportional and majority 
representation systems of voting, and stipulates that no less than 20 percent of the 
candidates must be women for each party and coalition.135 The law’s emphasis on a more 
diverse composition of parties and members has resulted in three political parties, one 
coalition, three independents, and nine female members being part of the current 
parliament.136 Mongolia’s percentage point for the Progress and Setbacks of Women in 
Lower or Single Houses of Parliament has increased by 9.6 points compared with the 
preceding legislature.137 More opportunity for various representatives of society through 
the electoral system can positively affect the translation of natural resources into 
development, by way of increasing the public voice.  
A close and accountable relationship between the state and its citizens is crucial 
for democracy to flourish; yet, this particular relationship is likely more isolated in 
resource-rich developing countries. Relying on the huge revenue flow from the resource 
sector, governments impose low taxes on citizens, which discourages them from 
demanding the government be held accountable for expenditure (as discussed in the 
previous chapter).138 In addition, resource-rich governments increase their size as well as 
the number of agencies, increasing the degree of inefficient expenditure. In Mongolia, 
135 Quota Project, “Global Database of Quotas for Women,” 
http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?country=147.  
136 InfoMongolia, “The Names of the 72 Candidates Received Seats in the Parliament of Mongolia,” 
http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/4481.  




                                                 
opposition party members criticize the current government for the increase of inefficient 
expenditure of the state budget. They state that according to the Ministry of Finance, 
foreign investment has decreased by nearly 70 percent in 2012‒2013; however, the 
budget expenditure for the public officials has increased due to establishment of five 
more ministries and 81 departments under those ministries, in comparison with the 
previous government structure. In other words, funds that could be used to build 150 
schools, 225 kindergartens, and a 300-kilometer road have been spent instead on these 
additional salaries.139 The more government agencies operate, the less opportunity exists 
for the establishment and involvement of independent and non-government institutions. 
Meaningful participation of non-government organizations and citizens must exist in a 
democratic society, and it should provide the government with checks and balances 
which ultimately consolidate democratic practice. On the other hand, the absence of such 
institutions and civil participation leads the government to lose efficient control over the 
country’s social, political, and economic issues and results in higher vulnerability to the 
risk of conflict.  
In Mongolia, environmental degradation is one issue on which public concern 
about the negative consequences from poorly managed mining operations has risen. In 
response, non-government organizations and civil movements to protect the country on 
this front have been established in the mining areas since 2000. Making up nearly 16 
percent of the GDP, the Mongolian agricultural sector has become the second biggest 
contributor to Mongolia’s economy, yet livestock alone supplies approximately 80 
percent of the total agricultural output.140 The booming extraction and exploration 
process of mining has directly threatened the livelihoods of locals, particularly herders. 
The Mongolian traditional way of herding in the vast countryside area without any 
limitation still exists, and “anyone may graze livestock on common land and everyone is 
139 Montsame, “Demand for Less Expensive and Compact Government (Засгийн Газрыг Бага 
Зардал, Цомхон Бүтцээр Ажиллахыг Шаардав),” 
http://www.montsame.mn/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=29149:2014-05-13-07-57-
34&itemid=648.  
140 World Bank, “Mongolia Economic Update 2013,” 30. 
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free to graze as many animals as they wish.”141 Available sources of scarce water have 
already been exceedingly damaged by irresponsible mining activities, negatively 
affecting the rural Mongolian populace. According to the Land Office of the Ministry of 
Nature and Environment, mining operation in Mongolia covers a total of 47 thousand 
hectares of land, and 100,000 hectares have already been damaged due to mining 
activities.142  
Pushing back against this environmental degradation, various international non-
government organizations have contributed to the establishment of domestic civil 
movements to protect environment. For example, The Asia Foundation in Mongolia 
supported the Ongi River Movement, and it further helped to the establishment of the 
Mongolian Nature Protection Coalition, which includes 11 other domestic movements. 
As a result, the movement stopped 35 mining operations in the basin of the Ongi River 
enabling the flow of the river which had been drained for years.143 In 2007, the leader of 
the coalition, Tsetsegee Munkhbayar, was awarded with the Goldman Environmental 
prize for peacefully and successfully organizing civil society. In 2013, however, 
Munkhbayar was arrested because of illegal gunfire near Parliament House during the 
protest led by him. The protestors’ purpose was to stop the potential amendment to the 
Law on Prohibition of Mineral Exploration and Mining Activities in River Basins, Water 
Reservoir Areas, and Forested Areas (The Long-Named Law), which was adopted in 
2009, for they believe that the change in the law will worsen the environmental 
degradation.144   
This arrest of the most well-known protestor against Mongolian environmental 
degradation caused by the mining operations is considered as the most adverse skirmish 
on mining issues between the demonstrators and the government. Some civilians view the 
incident as a result of spreading corruption among the politicians and civil movements 
141 N. Tumenbayar, “Herders’ Property Rights vs. Mining in Mongolia,” 
http://www.uvm.edu/~shali/Mining%20Mongolia%20paper.pdf . 
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that are financially dependent on international non-government organizations, and 
criticize them for operating for profit only, instead of becoming a true voice of the locals 
and citizens. Others view the incident a result of the government’s weakness in 
maintaining consistent and clear laws and regulations to efficiently coordinate interaction 
between the state and civilians. Moreover, they complain that the laws are not effectively 
enforced. For example, considering the fact that mining companies cannot operate 
without affecting the environment, the ministries in charge of their operation have to 
provide detailed environmental assessments that clarify the rehabilitation responsibilities 
of each side; in case of irresponsible action, the companies are charged equally. This 
procedure is the legal requirement; however, these laws are often not enforced in reality. 
Moreover, ambiguity and weak enforcement in the regulatory environment enable 
politicians to implement policies for their own benefit, in turn, ultimately discouraging 
the quality of democracy through inequality, corruption, and rent seeking. Mongolian 
politicians are extremely interested in expenditure of the resource wealth, making the 
sector highly susceptible to their decisions. In turn, this typically prevents efficient, long-
term-oriented policies and weakens the quality of the public investment. As commonly 
happens in resource-rich countries, the Mongolian government has a habit of over-
spending revenue from the resource sector. In recent years, when the government 
submitted the capital budget (Figure 7), the parliament always increased the budget 
without acknowledging detailed economic analyses for the associated institutions.145  
145 Hasnain, Incentive Compatible Reforms: The Political Economy of Public Investments in Mongolia 
(2011), 2.  
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Figure 7.  Capital Budget of Mongolia, 2006‒2010. 
The motivation of Mongolian politicians to become involved in the distribution of 
revenue is based on following conditions. The resource curse creates a situation in which 
many families live on insufficient income; therefore, physical investments based on their 
daily needs tend to be more appreciated by the public rather than long-term and state 
development aimed investments. Due to their visibility in public, investments are used by 
politicians as tools of publicizing themselves and, eventually, attracting votes.146 In 
addition, each parliament member represents a particular geographical constituency 
according to the electoral system. In order to please their constituents and increase their 
chance to be re-elected, parliament members compete to allocate more budgets for their 
particular constituents. This results in numerous separate and small-scale projects which 
are not efficient for the country as a whole. Mongolia has a vast territory and sparse 
population, yet it lacks big projects from which the whole country benefits, such as 
development of infrastructure and domestic manufacturers (Figure 8). Furthermore, these 
power-seeking policies of the main political parties and individual politicians escalate 
corruption, which is itself a major obstacle to the consolidation of democracy. Generally, 
resource abundance makes political leaders especially vulnerable to corruption and rent-
seeking behavior through the mutually beneficial relationship with businessmen. In other 
words, politicians protect private sector operations through a favorable regulatory 
146 Ibid. 
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environment and allocation of more investments, and in turn, businessmen give them a 
share of their profit.147 According to the Policy Research Paper by the World Bank, there 
is a close relationship between the business communities and parliamentarians in 
Mongolia.148   
 
Figure 8.  Distribution of Investment Projects by Size, 2008. 
Even though, there are some challenges to democracy as discussed previously, 
Mongolia is not likely to experience domestic conflict and civil war. First, Mongolia does 
not face geographical, ethnic, or religious tensions, which are all factors that have been 
found to heighten the risk of conflict in resource-rich countries. Ethnically, Mongolia is 
homogeneous, with a majority group of Khalkh Mongols who make up 86 percent of the 
total population. Even though 29 ethnic groups exist, they are not particularly distinct 
today. The biggest minority is Muslim Kazakh people who live in Bayan-Olgii province, 
the western part of Mongolia occupying about 5 percent of the total population.149 The 
minority group enjoys its freedom to use its own language, religion, and administrative 
147 Rosser, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey (2006), 15. 
148 Zahid Hasnain, Incentive Compatible Reforms: The Political Economy of Public Investments in 
Mongolia (2011), 2. 
149 E-Mongol, “Population and Demography of Mongolia,” http://www.e-
mongol.com/mongolia_population.htm.  
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unit. The group always has representation in the parliament, and their ethnic and social 
issues are not politicized. Overall, there is not much ethnic, lingual, or cultural distinction 
among the ethnic groups of Mongolia, and they are culturally and linguistically much 
assimilated into the majority group of the Khalkh.  
Second, in the case of Mongolian, there is no severe struggle for power among 
elites that could lead to conflict. In developing, resource-rich countries, the power of 
political leaders is stronger if they have better control over the resource management. 
Authoritarian governments tend to establish large militaries in order to repress potential 
demands and uprisings by the populace, and they use the military to prevent democratic 
pressures.150 Even though there is little serious conflict, governments that are susceptible 
to the conflict spend huge amounts of resource revenue to strengthen their militaries. In 
other words, this repressive method blurs core democratic accountability and dampens 
the extent to which leaders consider public opinion in decision-making processes.151 In 
the Mongolian case, the politicians’ competition for power is linked with the 
businessmen instead of military or enforcement organizations.    
B. BALANCING MONGOLIA’S INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Apart from the political economy policies, Mongolian natural resource wealth 
impacts its foreign and security policies, especially regarding neighboring states, China 
and Russia. Mongolia has been an independent state since its declaration of independence 
from Manchu rule in 1911. Nevertheless, its socio-economic and political policies have 
been dependent on two major powers—China and Russia. Due to today’s increased 
global demand for energy, Mongolia’s enormous source of untapped natural resources 
has attracted the interest of both regional and non-regional countries, particularly the two 
neighbors and other developed countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and 
Korea. This section of the chapter focuses on the impact of Mongolia’s natural resource 
wealth on its foreign and security policies. Mongolia’s natural resource management 
150 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (April 2001), 335. 
151 Ibid. 
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policies towards foreign countries cannot be independent from China and Russia, as is 
currently the case; therefore, Mongolia faces a challenge of sustaining good balanced 
policies to satisfy its two neighbors as well as other Western countries in order to 
maintain its autonomy.  
China and Russia are particularly interested in Mongolia’s resource wealth, 
because they have easy access to these resources due to socio-economic integration with 
Mongolia, as well as geographic proximity and infrastructure connections. Until the 
1990s, the world consumption of energy and mineral resources was much less than today. 
Mongolians had no need to tap a wide range of subsoil minerals until the Soviets left 
Mongolian territory. Yet, Russia’s involvement in the sector goes back decades. Most of 
the work to identify and classify the main subsoil mineral deposits such as copper, gold, 
and coal was performed by Russian-led geological teams during the Soviet period. In 
1973, Russia made investments to open Erdenetiin Ovoo (Hill of Minerals), which is the 
fourth largest copper and molybdenum mine in the world today. This joint venture has 
been extracting minerals for over 40 years, with the ownership share split 51/49, 
respectively, between the Mongolian and Russian governments.152 Major coal mining in 
Baganuur, Aduunchuluu, and Shariin Gol were established by Soviet investment. 
Currently, 265 joint ventures are operating in Mongolian mining fields, with a total of 
US$20 million investment.153 With its huge deposits of natural resources, Russia aims to 
play a global game in the energy sector, as President Putin has stated, “a role of the 
country in international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical 
influence.”154  
China’s involvement in the Mongolian mining sector, on the other hand, started 
much later than Russia’s participation. However, China has already become the leading 
trade partner of Mongolia. In 2005, China allocated 53 percent of its total investment in 
152 Sergey Radchenko, “Sino-Russian Competition in Mongolia,” http://www.theasanforum.org/sino-
russian-competition-in-mongolia/.  
153 Sergei Blagov, “Mongolia Drift Away from Russia to China, “ China Brief 10, no. 5 (2014).  
154 Alicia Campi, “The New Great Game in Northeast Asia: Potential Impact of Energy Mineral 
Development in Mongolia on China, Russia, Japan, and Korea, “ Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series, 2013, 
1. 
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Mongolia to mining areas, particularly coal. Since then, China has constantly increased 
its investment and involvement in Mongolian mining, and now it accounts for 89 percent 
of all Mongolian mineral exports.155 Mongolian coal exports to China make up 43 
percent of China’s coal imports, which are only 8 percent of its total coal needs.156 
According to the International Energy Agency, China leads the most energy-consuming 
countries in the world, and it has exceeded the United States’ status as the biggest global 
energy user. The agency also asserts that the consumption of Chinese energy will 
increase by 75 percent in the coming two decades.157 China constantly seeks to exercise 
its influence over the Mongolian economy and trade practices, in such a way as to 
increase Mongolian dependency on it. There is no reason to believe that China will 
diminish its interest in keeping its status as the dominant actor in the Mongolian mining 
sector. The fact of the globally increasing appetite for minerals and China’s and Russia’s 
interest in cheaper resources will keep Mongolia in a position of playing an active role in 
terms of regional stability and security policies.    
As a landlocked and developing country, Mongolia’s interest is to assure a 
balanced and friendly relationship with its neighbors. This strategy is legitimized through 
the National Security Concept of Mongolia, which states: “Good neighbor friendly 
relations and wide-ranging cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China shall be developed. More specifically, national interests and the 
history of bilateral relationships shall be taken into account while regional peace and 
stability as well as a general balance of relations with neighbors shall be sought.”158  
A bilateral relationship between Mongolia and Russia flourished during the 
Socialist period. The main infrastructure, power stations, and factories were established 
155 Clement Huaweilangand Dai and David Tyler Gibson, “Minegolia Part I: China and Mongolia’s 
Mining Boom, “ The Wilson Center, http://www.scribd.com/doc/152430266/Minegolia-Part-I-China-and-
Mongolia-s-Mining-Boom. 
156 Ibid.  
157 Jeffrey Hays, “Coal Exports To China,” Facts and Details, (2010).   
158 National Security Council of Mongolia, “National Security Concept of Mongolia, Chapter One, 




                                                 
under Soviet projects, and they still contribute to the Mongolian economy that was 
heavily dependent on large sums of Soviet assistance. When the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union took place, Mongolia pursued an open market economy, and its relationship with 
its two neighbors stagnated. Even though more than two decades have passed since then, 
Mongolian dependency on Russia still exists in some areas. For example, Mongolia has 
explored some oil and gas resources, and according to the estimation of American 
experts, there is at least 4 to 6 billion barrels of recoverable oil in Mongolia.159 
Nevertheless, the country has not built a local refinery, and it imports 95 percent of its 
petroleum products from Russia. Mongolia also lacks a capacity to cover its territory with 
electricity, due to the scarcely settled population in the countryside and their way of 
living in a traditional nomadic style. The Western provinces still import energy from 
Russia.   
The Mongolian generation, who lived and were educated in the Soviet Union 
during the Socialist period, is currently less predominant, yet their nostalgia for Socialism 
remains. The population that grew up during the period of “brotherly friendship” between 
Mongolia and Russia are now at the age of actively participating in social and political 
life. Therefore, the stagnated cooperation between Russia and Mongolia is easy to 
rejuvenate since the ordinary people of Mongolia no longer distrust Russia as they do 
China. Mongolian and Russian leaders have expressed their interest in stimulating 
bilateral ties, which have been expanded in recent years. Russia has increased its 
investment to Mongolia in the fields of socio-economic and defense issues.  
By contrast, the Mongolian people have been extremely sensitive to Chinese 
policies towards Mongolia, for they have a historical and deep-rooted distrust towards the 
Chinese state and ordinary people. Mongolians believe that they are the oldest ethnic 
nation that is not linked with China, whereas the Chinese consider Mongolians as a 
former part of the Middle Kingdom. Distrust towards each other still exists; for example, 
official complaints from the Chinese people who reside in Mongolia are commonly 
heard, expressing disappointment about unequal and intimidating treatment by the 
159 Wolf Petroleum, “Oil in Mongolia,” http://www.wolfpetroleum.net/mongolia/oil-in-mongolia. 
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Mongolians.160 At the political level, Mongolian and Chinese leaders emphasize the 
importance of trust and understanding toward each other,161 commending the fact that the 
two countries have no political, legal, or historical problems. China and Russia have been 
sensitive to, and carefully watchful of, the Mongolian government’s decisions associated 
with its natural resource management, especially coal and copper mining. If interests in 
resource management policy were to diverge between Mongolia and its large neighbors, 
still-dependent Mongolia would find itself in a much more challenging situation than 
China and Russia. 
To balance its interests with the international community and to maintain 
appropriate closeness to its neighbors, Mongolia needs to extend a “third neighbor” 
policy in all development sectors. This policy is legitimized by the statement in the 
National Security Concept of Mongolia: “Pursuant to a ‘third neighbor’ strategy, bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation with highly-developed democracies in political, economic, 
cultural, and humanitarian affairs shall be undertaken.”162 With a population of only 
700,000, Mongolia admitted the need of a security umbrella in the 1920s. It took the 
support of Russia similar to the way other East Asian states were protected under the 
security umbrella by the United States. In turn, during the Cold War period, Russia 
benefited from having Mongolia, along with its wide territory, as a buffer zone for its 
security. Mongolia’s current third neighbor policy “… does not seek to obtain a security 
umbrella or pledge of mutual defense obligations unless its existence is threatened 
militarily,”163 but it is driven by Mongolia’s survival challenge of being a geographically 
landlocked country between the two powerful states.   
Pursuing the third neighbor policy to strengthen its relationship with regional and 
Western countries, Mongolia will strengthen its security, consolidate democracy, and 
160 Mijiddorj Batchimeg, “Future Challenges for the PRC and Mongolia: A Mongolian Perspective,” 
China Brief 5, no. 10 (2005).  
161 Ibid.  
162 National Security Council of Mongolia, “National Security Concept of Mongolia, Chapter One, 
General Provisions 3.1.1.5.”  
163 Jargalsaikhan Mendee, “Mongolia’s Quest for Third Neighbours: Why the European Union?” 
EUCAM Policy Brief 25 (2012).  
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build a stable economy. Territorially, Mongolia has established a strong degree of 
sovereignty, not having any disputes on territorial and border issues with either China or 
Russia; nevertheless, it still has a risk to its sovereignty in terms of its independence. As 
discussed in previous chapters, one of the serious problems that weaken governance and 
institutional quality is corruption. Mongolia’s border length with China is 4,709.7 km and 
with Russia 3,543 km, out of the total length of 8,252.7 km.164 The potential of a security 
threat from the South is higher for Mongolians because of corruption enabled by the 
underdeveloped infrastructure and lack of development in the isolated rural areas.165 
There are nine border crossings between Mongolia and China, though only one is utilized 
at full capacity, while eight border crossings remain vulnerable to smuggling and illegal 
crossings. To legally cross these eight, and conduct business, customers need to drive 
several days to come to the office that issues visas. The faster and easier way is to corrupt 
customs officials, with both traveler and customs staff earning some benefit.166  
Mongolia’s “third neighbor” policy on its foreign relations was initially 
constituted in cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Korea, along with the 
United Nations, international organizations, and various regional institutions. Countries 
establish a good relationship through common interests from which both sides benefit. 
Located between two authoritarian-based countries, Mongolia has pursued a democratic 
way of development. This choice, politically, attracted the attention of the democratic 
states such as the United States and the Western countries to Mongolia. Economically, 
Mongolian natural resource abundance has brought it under the consideration of many 
other developed countries that are in need of resources. In other words, Mongolia has an 
opportunity to utilize its available sources to increase its integration with regional as well 
as global politics and socio-economic networks. However, in terms of building a stable 
economy, Mongolia should expand its development opportunity with third neighbors 
beyond the natural resource sector, diversify economic relations, and invest in sectors 
164 Global Security, “Mongolia - Border Troops / Border Forces,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/mongolia/border-troops.htm. 
165 Jeffrey Reeves, “Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance: Can Mongolia Avoid the ‘Resource 
Curse’?” (2011), 176.  
166 Ibid.  
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other than mining. For example, agriculture, livestock, and farming were the main sectors 
that generated revenue before the mining industry blossomed in Mongolia in the late 
1990s; and they were the main contributors to exports and the national GDP.  
 
Figure 9.  Contribution to GDP by Industry (2014).167 
International relationships and the sovereignty of developing countries are shaped 
by the national interests of the world’s powerful states. If Mongolia cannot assure global 
recognition of its government, it will be vulnerable to the implicit desires of China and 
Russia to keep the legitimacy and identity of Mongolia reliant on them. Therefore, even 
though Mongolia is an internationally accepted independent member state of the United 
Nations, it needs to maintain its third neighbor policy. The policy, however, brings a 
challenge to the Mongolian government in dealing with China and Russia—it obviously 
increases their displeasure with Mongolia, for it seeks developed and powerful partners 
other than those two.  
167 Bill Binks, Andrew Haylen, Sally Grimes, and Lyndal Thompson, Potential Agricultural 
Cooperation between Mongolia and Australia (Australia: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics and Sciences, March 16, 2014).  
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Mongolia’s integration within the international community has increased through 
the third neighbor policy. For example, Mongolia’s active participation in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions and NATO-led coalitional operations has contributed to the 
enhancement of its military capacity and its worldwide recognition. A bilateral 
peacekeeping exercise, “Khaan Quest,” between the United States and Mongolia was 
initiated in 2003. Since then, Mongolia has annually hosted the event, aiming to make it a 
regional event. The number of participating countries has constantly increased, and in 
2013, 1,000 officers from 14 nations, including the United States, Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, South Korea, Tajikistan, the United 
Kingdom, and Vietnam, participated in the exercise.168 The displeasure of the two 
neighbors, Russia and China, was expressed, and they did not send their participants. In 
2014, China is sending its contingent to participate in the “Khaan Quest” exercise for the 
first time, acknowledging Mongolia’s effort to strengthen regional peacekeeping 
capability. Moreover, bilateral exercises between China and Mongolia, and Russia and 
Mongolia, have regularly been held. However, the close relationship between the United 
States and Mongolia, particularly in the military field will be limited due to its neighbors’ 
discontent. For example, there are incidents in which China did not allow the United 
States to fly military transport planes to Mongolia via Chinese air territory. Mongolia’s 
achievement in attracting the interest of the international community is made not only by 
its own sole effort. The United States, as a major global power and the closest “third 
neighbor” of Mongolia, has enormously supported Mongolia’s involvement in global 
events. As a result, the immediate regional economics of the natural resource sector 
notwithstanding, the role of Mongolia in balancing power in the North East Asian region 
has continually increased.169  
168 InfoMongolia, “Khaan Quest 2013 to Start on August 3,” 
http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/6361.   
169 Jeffrey Reeves, “Resources, Sovereignty, and Governance: Can Mongolia Avoid the ‘Resource 
Curse’?” Asian Journal of Political Science (2011), 171. 
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V. CONCLUSION: VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS OF MONGOLIAN 
RESOURCE SECTOR GOVERNANCE 
Mongolia is endowed with abundant natural resources, including 8,000 deposits, 
and more than 440 types of minerals.170 During the Socialist period, Mongolia had 
limited access to the global market. It extracted only a small portion of its sub-soil 
resource wealth with the participation of the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1990, Mongolia pursued its own independent policy that promoted 
democracy and an open market system. This policy allowed for massive foreign 
investment in Mongolia, especially in the mining industry. As a result, Mongolia is now 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with an ever-increasing GDP.    
Nevertheless, Mongolia has experienced challenges both in managing its new 
democracy and its abundant natural resources. Mongolia has already experienced some 
symptoms of the resource curse, which is a common phenomenon in resource-rich 
developing countries. When a government collects huge revenue from its natural resource 
sector, it often ignores more traditionally important sectors to the economy, such as 
agriculture, livestock, and farming. An even more detrimental consequence is that the 
Mongolian economy has become extremely dependent on the mining sector, and as a 
result, corruption, rent-seeking, poverty, and inequality have become more prevalent in 
the country. Resource wealth is not the cause of the curse. Whether a resource-rich, 
developing country is able to translate its wealth into prosperity and prevent the resource 
curse depends on the government’s ability to efficiently manage its resources.  
A. SECTOR ORGANIZATION AND CONTRACT AWARDS 
The Mongolian experience in legal and regulatory environment of its mining 
sector demonstrates that the state lacks the ability to keep a consistent, transparent, and 
predictable regulatory environment. When the parliament amends or adopts laws, it tends 
to downplay the opinions of professionals and researchers or the debate among the public 
170 M.A.D., The Mongolian Real State Report.  
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and sector-participators. Therefore, there is the risk of enforcing the laws weakly, 
adopting the rules based on temporary benefits, and reneging on previous agreements.  
The Mongolian parliament adopted the Mineral Law in 1997 to regulate the 
activities and relations between the mining and socio-economic, environmental sectors. 
This core law improved the legal and regulatory environment of the Mongolian natural 
resource sector and established a positive atmosphere among its players. It especially 
created a favorable and investor-friendly environment by not applying high taxation and 
royalty burdens on them. The parliament did not amend the Mineral Law for a decade, 
and this consistency rapidly increased foreign investment in Mongolia, because investors 
were able to predict their future mining operations. Since 2006, the Mongolian parliament 
has adopted several significant laws related to the mining sector, but these laws have 
caused some controversy. An amendment to the 1997 Mineral Law created unfavorable 
conditions for investors. It increased taxes, banned foreign investors from directly 
owning mining licenses, and put a limit on the size of the exploration area. The short-
lived Law on Windfall Profit Tax, in effect from 2006 through 2011, decreased the 
attractiveness of Mongolian mining. The enactment of the Law on Prohibition of Mineral 
Exploration and Mining activities in River Basins, Water Reservoir Areas, and Forested 
Areas improved environmental protection; yet, the government revoked 254 mining 
licenses that had already been allocated before the law. 
In the ownership of the mining sector, excessive involvement of the Mongolian 
state is observed. State ownership erodes the capacity of the private mining companies 
that are unlikely to have the same rights and support from the state as the state-owned 
companies have. The absence of equality adversely impacts the responsibilities of the 
companies. In other words, the state limits its ability to demand the same responsibilities 
for both state and private companies. State involvement strengthened a strong tie between 
the political leaders and the business elites in the mining sector; consequently, corruption 
has flourished. Moreover, the state creates high costs and low productivity; for example, 
it is likely to have over-employment with higher salaries than the market average. The 
Mineral Law of Mongolia stipulated that the sub-soil minerals are the state property. 
State possession in the mining area may contribute to guaranteed long-term, sustainable 
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ownership policies and encourage capable conglomerates that efficiently coordinate the 
operations of the subsidiary. The Mongolian government established a state-owned 
Erdenes MGL mining company in 2007. The company holds exclusive rights over the 
significant deposits that are strategically important to the state security and economy, 
because each deposit has the capacity to produce more than 5 percent of the overall GDP. 
The operations and ownership of the company are very wide, and it holds a 50‒100 
percent share of the major Mongolian mining companies.  
The procedure to allocate exploration and extraction rights is highly susceptible to 
corruption, and vulnerability has escalated in the gaps in the Mongolian mining sector’s 
regulatory environment. The most common forms of allocation of rights are direct 
negotiation between the state and producers and criteria-based licensing. The sector lacks 
the detailed regulations and precise requirements for the companies and individuals on 
how to obtain exploration and extraction licenses. This gap increases the number of small 
and unincorporated applicants that obtain the licenses and resell them at higher prices, or 
it neglects responsible mining activities that are conducted by experienced and 
professional members. The sector produces poor quality contracts. When the government 
makes contracts, it looks for benefit rather than potential long-term consequences, while 
the sector companies seek to negotiate with the government to maximize their company 
rewards. This circumstance has eroded transparency and increased corruption in the 
sector. The government, however, is aware of the weaknesses and has made some 
progress in modifying the flaws. It is reviewing the process to issue new licenses and 
contracts, clarifying the requirements for transferring the existing licenses. Mongolian 
participation in the EITI since 2005, and its designation as compliant in 2010, has been 
an effort to promote the transparency in the sector. 
Capacity of the sector agencies is very much dependent on the political 
environment of Mongolia, and the quality of the sector has significantly worsened. A 
constitutional amendment in 2000 allowed Mongolian parliament members to hold 
simultaneous positions in the government. This amendment has distorted the separation 
of power, and the checks-and-balances between the Mongolian legislative and executive 
branches. The government service, which is influenced by the corrupt political and 
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business factions, has become an obstacle rather than leverage to the development of the 
state and private sectors. Moreover, the political fragmentation caused a lack of long-
term, national-level policy, and it further generated contradiction in the legal and 
operational environment of the sector agencies; for example, it created inconsistency and 
misperception, and overlaps among their responsibilities. Such a political and economic 
situation allowed corruption that damages the quality and effectiveness of the sector 
institutions, which ultimately spoils the overall capacity of the governance. 
B. COLLECTION OF TAXES AND ROYALTIES  
The government lacks a balanced tax policy that is favorable to both state and 
investors. The collection of tax and revenue has become vulnerable to corruption, 
because its regulatory system is overly complex, and administration is inadequate. 
Central and local authorities in the taxation area lack efficient coordination of rules, and 
they do not sufficiently monitor tax and revenue. The taxation system of the mining 
sector was very attractive until changes were made in the regulatory environment. The 
parliament approved the Law on Windfall Profit Tax in 2006 when the price of some 
commodities, including gold and copper was high in the global market. The law 
legitimized that the government imposes a 68 percent profit tax on companies if the 
market prices for gold and copper exceed a particular amount that is determined by the 
government. Policymakers abolished the law due to of the resulting decline in investor 
interest in the mining sector. An amendment to double the royalty rate accelerated the 
investment outflow, and the Mongolian extractive industry remained one of the highest 
mineral royalty regimes among resource-rich countries.171 Even so, the mining sector still 
has not been able to attract as many investors as it had before the amendment was made. 
It demonstrates how easy it is for the sector to lose attractiveness, and how difficult to 
regain it.  
171 Shapiro, “Economic Modernization in Mongolia” (2009), 17. 
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C. REVENUE DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT 
The political environment of Mongolia has negatively affected the distribution of 
revenue, for it encourages corruption and use of the revenue for political purposes. A 
number of funds were established from the revenue with the purpose of supporting 
sustainable growth; nevertheless, the majority of these funds was uneconomically spent 
as untargeted cash allowances because of the political promises that the parties had made 
during the parliamentary elections. Due to these promises, the government has damaged 
the overall economic situation. It was a good step that leaders of all political parties 
signed a memorandum in which they agreed not to compete with other parties by giving 
political promises, including a cash distribuiton to the citizens with the purpose of 
attracting constituents. At this step, an increasing level of corruption across government 
sectors is becoming the main obstacle to the establishment of a system that ensures 
transparent and fair wealth distribution to the citizens, and long-term, consistent growth.   
D. EFFECTS OF RESOURCE WEALTH ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
POLICIES 
The richness of natural resources can affect the regime type and domestic 
stability. Mongolia does not have a long history of democracy, but rather with 
authoritarian rule under a one-party political system. Under the current situation with 
resource curse symptoms, the young democratic regime of Mongolia is vulnerable to 
deterioration. If the state strengthens its governance and institutional capabilities to 
maintain its mineral wealth as an efficient source of development, the democracy will 
also be consolidated.  
One of the main factors to promote democracy is a close relationship between the 
state and its citizens; however, the relationship is likely put in question in the resource-
rich, developing countries. For Mongolian, there is a positive tendency to support this 
relationship. Civil movements and non-government organizations are able to conduct 
their activities and put some control on mining activities. Its political environment allows 
the representation of citizens to the parliament, and there are a number of members of 
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parliament and political parties who support the civil initiatives and responsible mining 
activities.  
There have been a number of civil protests against the state policies in the natural 
resource sector. These protests have mainly concentrated on the sector’s harmful impact 
on the environment. The movements complain about the government’s weakness in 
maintaining consistent and clear laws and regulations, as well as insufficient enforcement 
of those laws. Politicians contribute to the decline of democracy, because they create 
social inequality, particularly through their involvement in the distribution process of 
revenue from the mining sector. Moreover, they do not adequately represent the 
constituencies who democratically elected them, but represent themselves to the public 
using the mining profits as their political tool. Given the inequality among the public and 
politicians, and short-sighted policy aimed at their own benefit, Mongolian democracy 
faces the possibility of deteriorating.  
Even though there are some challenges to democracy as we have just discussed, 
Mongolia is not likely to experience domestic conflict and civil war. First, Mongolia does 
not have escalating geographic, ethnic, and religious tensions. Second, in the Mongolian 
case, there is no severe struggle for the power among the elites that would lead to 
conflict. Mongolian politicians’ competition for power is linked with the businessmen 
instead of military or enforcement organizations. 
E. BALANCING MONGOLIA’S INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The abundance of the natural resources has brought a new context to Mongolian 
international relations, especially with its two neighbors China and Russia. Due to 
today’s increased global demand for energy, Mongolia’s enormous source of unopened 
natural resources has attracted the interest of both regional and non-regional countries, 
particularly its two neighbors and other developed countries. However, Mongolia faces a 
challenge of sustaining healthy and balanced policies to satisfy its two neighbors as well 
as other Western countries. for Mongolia’s natural resource-management policies toward 
foreign countries cannot be independent from China and Russia.  
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Mongolia needs to continue the third neighbor policy that is legitimized by its 
National Security Concept to balance its interests with the international community and 
maintain appropriate closeness to the neighbors. This policy, however, should not be 
limited only to the natural resource sector, but should cover other sectors that Mongolia 
could use to expand its relationship and mitigate its dependency on one sector. 
International relationships and sovereignty of developing countries are shaped by the 
national interests of the powerful states in the world. Mongolia’s third neighbor policy 
increases the world recognition of the state, strengthens the legitimacy and identity of 
Mongolia, and ultimately makes Mongolia an important player in the regional stability 
and security policies.  
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